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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Resignation rumors intensify 
With international financial investigations increasingly focused on the Yel'tsin 
Kremlin, insecurity over the possibility of more terrorist bombings, and a 
broadening of the conflict in the North Caucasus, Russians seem to be waiting 
for a major reaction from the president. The most anticipated response is 
Yel'tsin's early resignation.  
 
Aleksandr Shokhin, former Yel'tsin government minister and once head of Our 
Home's Duma faction, has floated one of the most intriguing resignation 
scenarios. According to Shokhin, Yel'tsin may resign next month in order to force 
the leading presidential hopefuls into choosing between running for the Duma or 
standing in the early presidential elections, which may force their entire bloc out 
of contention for the Duma. (SEGODNYA, 20 Sep 99; via nexis) If the candidates 
opt for the presidential race, the result in the Duma would, according to Shokhin, 
be a fractured and weak, ultimately "manageable" legislature. If the candidates 
stay in the parliamentary race, the potential presidential candidates would be 
few, making selection of a hand-picked successor a much easier task. 
 
One development that may represent an argument against Yel'tsin's resignation 
involves the degree of Kremlin involvement in or approval of the selection of 
Sergei Shoigu, Minister for Emergency Situations, to head up the new regional 
bloc, "Edinstvo." Shoigu met with the president and received the "Hero of Russia" 
award just two days prior to accepting the leadership spot on "Edinstvo's" list. 
(RTR "VESTI" PROGRAM, 1300 GMT, 20 Sep 99; WPS Agency, via nexis) 
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Whether or not Yel'tsin approves, the prime minister was clearly not pleased: 
After meeting with Putin, Shoigu announced that he will take vacation time off 
from the ministry in October in order to concentrate on the upcoming elections. 
Shoigu did stress, however, that he was not asked to resign. (INTERFAX, 27 Sep 
99; via nexis) 
 
As to the successor watch: In addition to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, 
Aleksandr Lebed's name has recently resurfaced as a possible presidentially 
sanctioned candidate. Lebed has recaptured public attention in the wake of the 
fighting with the Basaev-led rebels in Dagestan.  
 
GOVERNMENT 
Putin links bombings, political strife source 
While no suspects have, at this time, been charged in connection with the 
bombings this month in Russia, the general assumption of law enforcement 
officials and politicians is that they are connected with the Chechen-Islamist 
insurgency in Dagestan. There is also a strong belief that the insurgents have 
international financing, hence Prime Minister Putin has declared Russia's 
struggle now to be with international terrorism. 
 
In a closed session of the Federation Council on 17 September, Putin apparently 
also laid significant blame on Chechnya and decried the peace accord signed in 
1996 (and brokered by Lebed) as a "mistake." Putin has recently broadened the 
military response to the insurgency by launching bombing raids in Chechnya, at 
the airport and outside the capital of Dzhokhar-gala (formerly Grozny). 
 
After five days of bombings, Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov claims that 
over 300 civilians have been killed. (BBC World Service, 0910 EDT, 27 Sep 99; 
via WBUR) Russia's NTV claims, however, that the air forces have killed 2,000 
Chechen rebels. (Agence-France Presse, 0511 PDT; via C-afp@clari.net) 
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Defense Minister Igor Sergeev has confirmed contingency planning for a ground 
invasion, possibly to create a "safety zone" around Chechnya. 
 
Putin has justified the bombings by stressing the need to hit out at international 
terrorism wherever it is found. He has also blamed international terrorism for the 
rumors circulating about the president's resignation, claiming "I am sure that 
these are rumours deliberately started by those who are attacking Russia in 
order to destabilise the internal political situation." (Agence-France Presse, 0250 
PDT, 24 Sep 99; via C-afp@clari.net) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Chandler Rosenberger and Sarah Miller 
 
Scandal threatens US administration's Russia policy 
Revelations that loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and technical 
assistance from the US government may have been abused by Boris Yel'tsin's 
economic "reformers" inspired the House Committee on Banking and Finance to 
question the efficacy of the administration's Russia policy. 
 
While high-ranking administration officials insisted that the United States faced a 
choice between remaining engaged in Russian reform and withdrawing into 
isolation, administration critics insisted that the US must change its strategy of 
engagement to avoid further corrupting Russian domestic politics. 
 
At the heart of money-laundering allegations is the charge that in August 1998 
the Russian Central Bank bypassed the ordinary currency markets in order to sell 
18 Russian banks more than $4 billion dollars lent by the IMF. If true, the 
allegation would demonstrate how close ties between the Russian government 
and its friends in the private sector had allowed Russian oligarchs to convert their 
assets to hard currency before the crash of the Russian ruble. The oligarchs 
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would have gained for their own assets the kind of financial underpinning that 
had been meant to benefit the Russian currency itself. (INTERFAX, 0952 GMT, 
20 Sep 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0920, via World News Connection) 
 
In his congressional testimony, US Secretary of the Treasury Lawrence 
Summers defended international aid to Russia as an important means by which 
to keep Russian economic reforms on track. The IMF and the US government, 
Summers said, had frequently used the threat of withholding aid to encourage 
the Russians to attempt to keep inflation under control and enforce tax collection. 
The administration, he added, had sought to bolster Russian political stability by 
encouraging economic stability. 
 
"Economic instability in Russia," Summers said, "raises important concerns for 
our national security, given Russia's pivotal and continuing role with respect to 
nuclear security, the battle against terrorism, the stability of Eurasia, and conflict 
resolution in global hotspots like the Balkans." (TESTIMONY OF LAWRENCE H. 
SUMMERS before the House Banking Committee, 21 Sep 99; via Johnson's 
Russia List) 
 
The administration's critics, however, questioned whether the White House had 
bought the stability that it had sought. Former CIA Director James Woolsey 
argued that the Clinton administration had squandered much of the good will 
ordinary Russians felt towards the United States by identifying itself so closely 
with Russian politicians rightly perceived as deeply corrupt. 
 
"We have, through the IMF and otherwise, pushed for increased tax collections 
and tight budgets," Woolsey said. "Each of these approaches at one time or 
another might have been defensible. But if one looks back from them and looks 
at the overall pattern, it is easy to see how ordinary Russians, who saw us in 
highly idealized terms just a few years ago, have turned sour on the United 
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States." (TESTIMONY OF JAMES WOOLSEY before the House Banking 
Committee, 21 Sep 99; via Johnson's Russia List) 
 
Made in America 
The financial architecture of Russia's banking scandal was designed by a team of 
US advisors based at Harvard University's Institute for International 
Development, according to a prominent American academic. 
 
In a series of articles in the American press, University of Pittsburgh Professor 
Janine Wedel has illustrated the close ties among the "dream team" of Russian 
economists around Anatoly Chubais, the US administration and Harvard 
University. Citing "foreign policy considerations," the administration reportedly 
bypassed ordinary bidding procedures in order to guarantee that the Institute for 
International Development handled the vast majority of US technical assistance 
on Russian privatization. 
 
The controversial "loans-for-shares" scheme, which allowed seven Russian 
banks to receive state property at highly discounted rates, was reported to have 
been designed by Chubais associate Vladimir O. Potanin with the help of a 
Harvard economist, Andrei Schleifer. Despite bans on foreign entities 
participating in the original privatization process, the Harvard Management 
Company, the university's endowment fund, reportedly was allowed to join 
Potanin's Uneximbank on two of its sweetest privatization deals. (LOS ANGELES 
TIMES, 21 Sep 99; via Johnson's Russia List) Since 1997 the Department of 
Justice has been investigating allegations that Schleifer personally profited from 
his work as an advisor on Russian privatization. 
 
There are at least two ties between the Russian scandal and the US 
administration. While serving as deputy secretary of the Treasury, Lawrence 
Summers presided over the administration's strategy for offering technical 
assistance to the Russian reformers. Summers, Wedel notes, worked with 
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Schleifer at Harvard, co-authored a number of academic articles with him and 
directed the US government to hire Schleifer's institute as the primary architect of 
US technical advice. 
 
US investigators are also examining the role of Grigory Luchansky in the alleged 
money-laundering scheme run through the Bank of New York. Luchansky, 
purportedly a major figure in the Russian mafia, was photographed with the US 
president at a fund-raiser for the Democratic Party in 1993. (RUSSIA REFORM 
MONITOR, 14 Sep 99) 
 
In congressional testimony that went largely uncovered in the American press, 
former chief Russian analyst of the CIA Fritz Ermarth alleged that American 
banks, particularly those heavily invested in Russian bonds, had consciously 
overlooked evidence of corruption in foreign aid and money-laundering. The 
banks, Ermarth proposed, had contributed heavily to political campaigns in the 
hope of maintaining US political support for continued aid. (TESTIMONY OF 
FRITZ W. ERMARTH before the House Committee on Banking and Finance, 21 
Sep 99; via Johnson's Russia List) 
 
This is cooperation? 
If the Clinton administration had hoped that economic support would encourage 
Russia to follow the US lead in international relations, Moscow's behavior on 
several fronts calls into question the efficacy of the administration's policies. 
 
Moscow, for example, has put up renewed resistance to United States legislation 
imposing sanctions on firms exporting nuclear and missile technology to Iran. 
The Russian foreign ministry argued that the bill would "have the most negative 
impact on US-Russian cooperation in the fields on non-proliferation and exports 
control." (ITAR-TASS, 1402 GMT, 16 Sep 99; FBIS-NES-1999-0916, via World 
News Connection) 
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At the United Nations Security Council, Russia has formed a joint front with 
China and France to persuade the UN to overturn sanctions against Iraq. Iraqi 
opposition to the return of UN weapons inspectors has prevented the Security 
Council from lifting minor restrictions on its oil sales. Although the restrictions 
have always allowed proceeds from the sale of oil to be used for purchase of 
medicine and food, the Russian government continued to argue in the Security 
Council meetings that the United States and Great Britain were punishing the 
Iraqi people unfairly. The Russian government, press reports stated, had 
threatened to veto any proposal put before the Security Council without its 
support. (THE GUARDIAN, 14 Sep 99) 
 
Multipolarism: from rhetoric to policy 
Russia's high-level representation at the 1999 Asian Pacific Economic (APEC) 
Forum meeting held in Auckland, New Zealand on 12-13 September reflects 
Moscow's increasing emphasis on its Asian policy. On the margins of the forum, 
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin met with his counterparts from China, Japan and 
South Korea, a demonstration of Russia's progress in improving political and 
economic relations across Asia.  
 
Thus far, Russia's Asian policy has been primarily economics-driven. With China, 
arms and technology have been the key to their "strategic cooperative 
partnership." But as that relationship has solidified, Russia and China have 
begun to bring more substance to their multipolar-based partnership beyond 
arms sales. In early September, the Russian and PRC Border Cooperation 
Protocol was signed and has actually been implemented. Russian and Chinese 
guards have cooperated in securing a "peaceful" border and in fighting crime. 
The protocol calls for even further, formal cooperation between the countries 
such as policing their 2,000-km border. In contrast to the Sino-Soviet border 
skirmishes of only 25 years ago, this progress in cooperation is even more 
significant. Also in early September, Putin signed an ordinance that will increase 
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oil shipments to China. (ITAR-TASS, 0748 GMT, 9 Sep 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-
0909, via World News Connection)  
 
Even with Japan -- with whom Russia's dealings have been particularly strained -
- Russia has successfully improved relations. In accordance with the Moscow 
Declaration signed in November 1998, a visa-free regime on the Kurile Islands is 
being implemented so that former Japanese residents of the Russian-occupied 
islands can visit their families. The first visits occurred earlier this month. 
(INTERFAX, 0935 GMT, 12 Sep 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0912, via World News 
Connection) Russia has also just received another $50 million tranche of a $1.5 
billion Japanese loan. Furthermore, the Sakhalin-2 joint oil and gas project has 
already begun producing oil, prompting the prime ministers to contemplate 
upgrading Russo-Japanese relations to that of "strategic economic partners" 
soon.  
 
It seems that as long as the political and economic benefits remain, Russia's 
Asian policy will continue to flourish. Still, as with all diplomatic initiatives, there 
are bumps in the road. In a recent interview the new Japanese ambassador to 
Moscow, Minoru Tamba, said that relations with Russia were inferior to Japan's 
relations with the US or China. However, in the same interview Tamba was much 
more optimistic about the value of "time" in Russo-Japanese relations, saying 
"whether the [peace] treaty is realized in 1999 or 2001 is a minor issue." (NHK, 
1217 GMT, 16 Sep 99; FBIS-EAS-1999-0916, via World News Connection) This 
contrasts Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi's official rhetoric in which he still 
insists on a peace treaty with Russia by 2000.  
 
Despite these bumps, Russia is slowly building mutually beneficial, substantive 
relations with Asian nations, indicating that multipolarism may have substance 
beyond the rhetoric. 
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Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
MEDIA 
Media verify bureaucratic chaos 
In an interview with Argumenty i fakty, Lev Koshlyakov, the director-general of 
the "Vesti" television company, noted that no single leader of the government or 
the president's office existed. "There is no single authority nowadays. There are 
conflicts between the branches of authority. We are trying to avoid becoming a 
hostage in this conflict. But the problem is that each department thinks that state 
television should first and foremost show its leader or its successes." 
(ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, 0000 GMT, 8 Sep 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0908, via World 
News Connection) 
 
Many foreign observers of Russian politics tend to overlook the fact that the 
administrative apparatus of the Russian state is fractured, possibly demoralized, 
and internally contentious, as Koshlyakov points out. Yel'tsin's recent signing (13 
September 1999) of the bill enabling the construction of a "media ministry," 
technically known as the Russian Federation Ministry of the Press, Television 
and Radio Broadcasting and Mass Communications, can be seen as an attempt 
to re-unify those agents responsible for monitoring the nation's mass media. It 
would seem that the last thing the federation needs now is yet another ministry, 
but if the laws can be enforced and the more egregious examples of bias for one 
or another political figure be taken out, perhaps a new ministry is not such a bad 
idea. A potential problem, however, is that a unified ministry empowered to 
monitor all aspects of a free press could potentially be used as an instrument to 
tamper with or control the same publications. 
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In the interview, Koshlyakov also claimed to be above political squabbles, and 
declared his and his program's neutrality. He did have to admit, once prompted 
by the interviewer, that Vesti was the only program to run the now famous video 
of former Prosecutor General Yuri Skuratov in a hotel room cavorting with 
prostitutes. Koshlyakov conceded that airing the video was "wrong," though he 
explained that the studio's intention was to question the morality of a man 
entrusted with upholding the nation's laws. 
 
The fact is that the entire video affair, as is slowly being made known, had less to 
do with the prosecutor general's morals than it did with an attempt to stop his 
criminal probe into the relationship between Yel'tsin, his family, and the Swiss 
construction firm Mabetex. The scandal concerns reported kickbacks made by 
Mabetex to the Yel'tsin family in the form of open-ended credit cards in exchange 
for construction contracts for the recent renovation of the Kremlin.  
 
When asked by a reporter for the Italian newspaper La Repubblica if it was 
indeed he in the film, Skuratov replied angrily, "You surprise me. There is no 
more talk of that here. You are the first foreign journalist who has asked me. I am 
sick of answering." Whether the retort is that of an innocent man wrongly 
accused, or of a guilty man caught in the act, remains to be decided, though the 
figure in the video did possess a strong resemblance to the former prosecutor. 
(LA REPUBBLICA, Internet version, 15 Sep 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0915, via World 
News Connection) 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
Poll puts Fatherland-All Russia on top 
A poll conducted at the beginning of September netted the following results: 
 
- 23 percent for Fatherland-All Russia election bloc, headed by former Prime 
Minister Yevgeni Primakov, Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and St. Petersburg 
Governor Vladimir Yakovlev. 
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- 20 percent for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) headed 
by Gennadi Zyuganov. 
 
- 12 percent for YABLOKO, whose federal election list includes former Prime 
Minister Sergei Stepashin as No. 2 after Grigori Yavlinsky. 
 
- 5 percent for Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia. 
 
The rest of the pack -- the People's Republican Party of Krasnoyarsk Governor 
Aleksandr Lebed, the Union of Right Forces of former Prime Minister Sergei 
Kirienko, Our Home is Russia of ex-Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin -- fell below the 
five percent barrier required to enter the Duma.  
 
Interestingly, the same poll conducted exclusively among Muscovites gave only 
three national parties the coveted five-percent support.  
 
- 26 percent for Fatherland-All Russia. 
 
- 16 percent for YABLOKO. 
 
- 8 percent for the CPRF. (NTV, 1700 GMT, 12 Sep 99; via nexis) 
 
Again, it must be stressed that support for particular parties will most directly 
affect only half of the delegates chosen to sit in the Duma based on proportional 
representation from national party lists. The second half of the Duma is seated by 
single-member districts. As with the last Duma election, parties which were 
unable to overcome the five-percent hurdle might find representation through the 
election of a member from a single-member district. But the relationship between 
support for a particular party and the selection of a delegate to represent that 
voter's district is not clear. As in Germany, Russians are given two ballots: one to 
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voice support for a particular party and one to elect a delegate from that district. If 
the German experience, or indeed the experience in the last Duma election, is 
any guide, voters have a tendency to "balance" their votes by choosing different 
parties at the national level and at the district level. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By LCDR James Duke Jr. And Lt. Col. Jill Skelton 
 
Military exercises: Some things may never change 
Russian Pacific Fleet aircraft recently conducted training flights and missile 
firings in the Northern Pacific. One flight of Bear aircraft approached the Alaskan 
coastline, triggering the US to scramble F-15 jet fighters for identification. The 
fighters approached the Bears to within 90 miles before the Russian aircraft 
turned and continued their flight through international airspace. The last similar 
occurrence was over six years ago. (REUTERS, 18 Sep 99; via Washington Post 
On-line) 
 
News of Russian Bear aircraft conducting training flights in international airspace 
is not militarily significant; however, it is interesting to note the exercise's 
objectives: "to combat an enemy carrier battle group and to repulse an attack 
from its air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles." (NEZAVISIMAYA 
GAZETA, 15 Sep 99; via BBC) One might as well put "US" in front of "carrier 
battle group." Russia also staged a much larger exercise in June, dubbed "West 
99." The exercise's scenario included attacks from 450 aircraft and 120 cruise 
missiles on Russia's western and northern frontiers. (ITAR-TASS, 1842 GMT, 23 
Jun 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0623, via World News Connection) Although neither 
scenario named the US as the enemy, the US is the only country realistically 
capable of large-scale aircraft and cruise missile attacks. Despite ethnic conflict 
in bordering states, internal terrorist attacks, unpaid personnel, and lack of parts 
and fuel to operate equipment, Russia continues to spend its meager funds on 
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highly visible exercises whose scenarios have little relevance combating more 
likely threats. Communism's collapse and the discontinued anti-Soviet US 
political rhetoric have not changed the mindset of Russia's military leadership. 
Russia's military still views the US as its primary opponent. 
 
Russian attack submarine launched 
Russia launched a new Shchuka-B attack submarine on 17 September at the 
Severodvinsk shipyard. (INTERFAX, 1242 GMT, 17 Sep 99; BBC Summary of 
Broadcasts, via nexis) The submarine's more familiar NATO codename is Akula 
II, and it is an improved version of the Akula-class submarines which were 
launched from 1984 to 1990. The Akula is an extremely quiet nuclear-powered 
attack submarine capable of carrying torpedoes and cruise missiles. Its low 
sound levels surprised Western intelligence agencies when it first put to sea 
since they believed the Soviet Union was 8-10 years from achieving this level 
quietness. (GUIDE TO THE SOVIET NAVY, 1991; Naval Institute Press) No 
Akula IIs have entered service, though. Russia launched two Akula IIs from 1992 
to 1994, however their completion is listed as "suspended," so it is doubtful they 
will enter service within the next two years. (WARSHIPS1, 17 Jun 99) The 17 
September Akula II launching indicates Russia still has the industrial base and 
expertise to produce advanced submarines, albeit at a feeble pace compared to 
Cold War levels. 
 
The Nikitin saga: Will it ever end? 
Aleksandr Nikitin, the retired naval officer turned environmentalist, is in line for 
trial after being charged 2 July an unprecedented eighth time for espionage. 
(THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, 10 Sep 99; via nexis) The Federal Security Service 
(FSB) arrested Nikitin in February 1996 after the Bellona Foundation, a 
Norwegian environmental group, published a scathing report detailing Russia's 
mishandling of nuclear waste. Nikitin's research was a primary source for the 
report. (See The NIS Observed, 7 Oct 98) 
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Nikitin denies his espionage charges, saying the information he provided the 
Norwegian environmental group was available from numerous open sources. His 
defense team fought previous charges because they were based on secret 
decrees enacted years after his arrest. In February, the Russian Federation 
Supreme Court and General Prosecutor's Office specifically directed the FSB 
against using secret and retroactive normative acts. Despite the order Nikitin 
faces charges based on secret decrees once again; in addition, the FSB has 
added a retroactive federal law to the list. (THE BELLONA FOUNDATION, 2 Jul 
99) There is hope for Nikitin. The court has assigned Judge Sergei Golets, the 
same judge who dismissed the "unclear" charges last October and ordered a 
"reinvestigation." According to Boris Pustintsev, chairman of the human rights 
group Citizens' Watch, Judge Golets was the first justice in Russia's post-Soviet 
history to dismiss charges brought by the FSB. Nikitin's case will probably not be 
heard until next year. (THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, 10 Sep 99; via nexis) 
 
The trial may demonstrate the strength or weakness of Russia's judicial system. 
In November 1997 the FSB arrested Grigori Pasko, a Russian officer, for passing 
state secrets to the Japanese media. The state secrets were a report and video 
of Russian ships dumping radioactive and chemical waste into the Pacific Ocean. 
Fortunately the court determined the FSB forged two alleged "incriminating 
documents." This blatant abuse of evidence led to Pasko's release. (DEUTSCHE 
PRESS-AGENTUR, 0604 CET, 20 Jul 99; via nexis) However, following his 
release, Pasko was not issued a passport and still faced administrative 
harassment which prevented travel to the United States. Pasko's trial indicates 
Russia's judicial system is at least heading towards legitimacy; however, for 
political reasons the FSB refuses to accept Nikitin's January 1997 release from 
prison and the agency's repeated failure to obtain a conviction. It will be 
noteworthy if Russia's courts survive the powerful FSB's four-year war of attrition. 
 
Chemical weapons remain undestroyed 
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Russia's ability to honor commitments and destroy 40,000 tons of declared 
chemical munitions are "under threat of collapse," stated Zinovy Pak, general 
director of the Russian Munitions Agency. (IZVESTIA, 16 Sep 99; BBC Summary 
of World Broadcasts, via nexis) Russia officially cites lack of funding. For 
example, in 1996 the Ministry of Defense received only 13 percent of the 
required funding for scrapping chemical munitions, 2.2 percent in 1997, and 2.1 
percent in 1998. (ITAR-TASS, 0748 GMT, 30 Nov 98; FBIS-SOV-98-334, via 
World News Connection ) The West, including the US, has pledged to supply 
destruction equipment and funding. Russia's real priorities are suspect. Although 
Russia sends money to advanced weapons research and development, in June 
1997 the Russian Duma requested an additional $5 billion in foreign assistance 
for chemical weapons destruction. (See The NIS Observed, 12 Jul 97) Any 
assistance sent to Russia is diluted with levies, taxes, and customs duties. In 
addition there is some doubt Russia has declared all of her chemical munitions. 
Unless there is a change in priorities, Russia will make little progress destroying 
its stock of chemical weapons in the near future. Meanwhile the large stock of 
weapons in a lawless country is a juicy target for theft. 
 
No, no... we won't go... 
Tatarstan, on 15 September, suspended the republic's military draft for the 
Russian armed forces until Tatar conscripts are removed from "hot spots" and 
returned to permanently assigned bases. The State Council passed this 
resolution following a report that six conscripts drafted in Tatarstan had been 
killed in recent fighting in Dagestan. Two of these conscripts had been drafted 
less than 40 days before being sent to Dagestan. The decision to suspend the 
draft as stated in the resolution "is a result of numerous instances when 
untrained servicemen from Tatarstan were sent to hot spots and that led to 
unwarranted losses." This action violates Moscow's agreement to send only 
trained volunteers to combat areas, according to the Tatarstan parliament. 
(INTERFAX, 15 Sep 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0915, via World News Connection, and 
BBC, 16 Sep 99; via nexis)  
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This action by Tatarstan highlights an increasingly grim story for Russia's military 
draft system and the plight of conscripts drafted into the Russian armed forces. 
Currently the Russian Federation holds two drafts a year -- spring and fall -- in 
which young men between the ages of 18 and 27, who are not already members 
of the reserve, are conscripted into compulsory service for a period of one to two 
years. For the 1999 Spring draft, the target number was 168,776 conscripts. 
(ITAR-TASS, 30 Mar 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0330, via World News Connection) 
This number represents only about 14 percent of the total young men registered 
for the draft. (ITAR-TASS, 7 Apr 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0406, via World News 
Connection) Despite this low percentage, Russia is having a difficult time 
meeting the quotas. An ever-increasing number of eligible men are evading 
compulsory military service for a variety of reasons. Most often cited are low 
standards of living, military assignments, and the fear of vicious hazing by more 
senior NCOs and officers.  
 
With the general condition of Russia's military forces deteriorating, the life for 
conscripts who are at the bottom of the ladder is bleak, even in elite units. There 
are reports of officers hiring out their conscripts as laborers or making them beg 
on the streets. (ASSOCIATED PRESS, 3 Jul 99; via nexis) New conscripts are 
receiving minimal combat training, and are at the end of the line when it comes to 
food, clothes, and basic necessities. With the drawdown of military personnel, 
new conscripts can no longer expect to receive assignments to requested military 
units. Instead they are being sent, in many cases, to units many farther away 
from home and family and placed in hazardous positions much earlier than would 
be normal. They see much of the NCOs and officers, whose purpose is to train, 
mentor, and serve as role models, more and more frequently as frustrated, 
desperate, and demoralized leaders... and many of the military leaders are taking 
out their frustrations on the conscripts.  
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According to Russia's chief military procurator, Dedovshchina (hazing of 
conscripts) is the second most "popular" military crime after desertion. It is 
believed that hundreds of soldiers desert each year, while scores commit suicide 
or are killed because of bullying and hazing. Although the statistics indicate that 
these beatings and fights are becoming rarer, 987 of such cases (192 deaths) so 
far in 1999 confirm hazing is alive and well. (VREMYA MN, 6 Aug 99; FBIS-SOV-
1999-0822, via World News Connection) In 1997, the defense ministry reported, 
2,000 soldiers died as a consequence of hazing. The Committee of Soldiers' 
Mothers, who monitors these numbers closely, believes the number was closer 
to 3,900. (ISCIP Editorial Digest, 22 Jan 98) In June 1999, 45 Russian conscripts 
deserted their unit in the Maritime territory claiming hazing and brutal treatment 
on the part of junior officers. (ITAR-TASS, 9 Jun 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0608, via 
World News Connection) In August, a conscript shot two fellow soldiers at an 
army base and then turned the assault rifle on himself. Two sailors in Russia's 
Northern Fleet used an ax to kill a guard and then stole assault rifles. They used 
these assault rifles to shoot fatally an officer and another sailor and wound two 
other sailors before they were surrounded by a special commando unit. The 
commandos killed one attacker and the second committed suicide. 
(ASSOCIATED PRESS, 6 Aug 99; via nexis) These numbers and the stories of 
serious conditions faced by military conscripts are not isolated; their plight is 
often reported in the Russian media. 
 
... And if we go... we must be sick or crazy 
Also reported are increasing accusations levied at military draft boards, stating 
they are deliberately enlisting lower quality conscripts. Russian Defense Minister 
Sergeev stated in 1997 that, ten years previously, less than 10 percent of 
conscripts lacked secondary education. Now the figure is closer to 50 percent. 
Additionally, 10 percent were drug addicts, while 20 percent had a criminal 
record. (ISCIP Editorial Digest, 4 Dec 97) It is generally believed that military 
draft boards are admitting conscripts with "obvious signs of psychiatric 
disturbances" (INTERFAX NEWS AGENCY, 1 Jul 99; via nexis) and with other 
 18 
obvious health problems, all for the sake of meeting their quotas. Why are they 
doing this? Most reporting leads to two reasons. First, an increasing number of 
eligible young men are avoiding the draft by either applying for available 
deferments and exemptions or simply going into hiding. Second, defense ministry 
officials and others argue that the overall physical condition of the general 
population and, therefore, of draftees, has deteriorated. For whatever reason, 
commanders of military units to which these questionable conscripts are being 
sent are going so far as to file lawsuits against the draft boards, claiming the 
boards are enlisting young men who should be refused for obvious health 
reasons. As of August 1999, 100 lawsuits had been filed through the military 
prosecutor's offices against local military enlistment agencies. (NOVIYE 
IZVESTIA, 19 Aug 99; via nexis) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Sarah Miller 
 
Pulling together to fight terrorism 
In the wake of international terrorist attacks in Kyrgyzstan and Russia, several 
CIS defense ministers met in Moscow on 15 September to discuss military and 
technological support to Kyrgyzstan. The emergency session was called by the 
Kyrgyz president and attended by the defense members from Armenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Uzbekistan. Two GUUAM (Georgia, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) members, Georgia and 
Azerbaijan, sent representatives. In addition to military and technical assistance, 
Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan agreed to hold joint 
military exercises in Uzbekistan in late October.  
 
Although press reports indicated that the extraordinary meeting was limited to 
CIS Collective Security Treaty (CST) members -- sometimes referred to as the 
"Russian-6" -- GUUAM members Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Georgia also 
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attended. By doing so, they underscored their recognition of the problem's 
pervasiveness. In the post-meeting report, the ministers noted this universal 
threat, saying that international terrorist actions "create a threat to the security of 
Central Asia as a whole." (INTERFAX, 16 Sep 99; via nexis) Putin expanded the 
prognosis to the entire CIS, saying that the militants' aim is destruction of the 
CIS, subversion of their security and the ultimate establishment of "pseudo-
theocratic but essentially military dictatorial regimes in countries that have 
traditionally been close to us." (INTERFAX, 15 Sep 99; via nexis) Although it is 
unlikely that the GUUAM members will be drawn back into the CST by the 
terrorist threat, their reaction and rhetoric indicate that on a case-by-case, ad hoc 
basis, they are willing at least to consult and coordinate with the Russian-6 to 
combat disruptive forces. 
 
However, old rivalries and suspicions continually surface. Only a day before the 
emergency session in Moscow, Chief of the Russian Defense Ministry 
Department for International Cooperation Leonid Ivashov suggested that 
Azerbaijan and Georgia allowed "militants as well as their arms and financial 
supplies" to pass unimpeded through their territory. (INTERFAX, 0931 GMT, 14 
Sep 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0914, via World News Connection) Although Georgia 
and Azerbaijan have repeatedly condemned terrorist activities in nearby 
Dagestan and have publicly announced their willingness to cooperate in anti-
terrorist measures, statements like Ivashov's could undermine the cooperation 
necessary to confine and disrupt terrorist organizations within the CIS. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Newly independent state seeks others for fun, friendship, and mutual 
benefit  
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Are you a country in need of a friend? Might we suggest Ukraine? The country is 
more than willing to create a friendship package to fit any specifications, and 
although it asks much in return, it often accepts less. Applications are now being 
processed. Countries with similar outlook are preferred, but if all friendship 
vacancies are not filled and all needs not met, those with differing viewpoints will 
be accepted.  
 
Ukraine certainly has been everyone's friend lately. From offering its own Kosovo 
peace plan and peacekeepers, to mediating in Abkhazia and Transdniestr, to 
fostering its partnership with NATO, shepherding the growth of GUUAM, and 
taking a larger leadership role in the CIS, Ukraine has been reaching out to just 
about every country and regional organization in its vicinity. Although it has had 
somewhat limited success with major Western countries, this strategy has 
allowed Ukraine to build a solid base in its own region. It has also allowed it to 
maintain its relationship with Russia, for better or for worse. 
 
Ukraine's local success was on display during September's Yalta-99 Summit, 
where the country acted as host, big brother, captain and buddy to 21 other 
countries of the Black Sea and Baltic regions. The theme of the summit, "Toward 
an Integrated Europe of the 21st Century without Dividing Lines," underscored 
Ukraine's efforts to survive in the murky middle ground between Eastern and 
Western interests. The summit dealt mostly with evolving plans for transport 
corridors linking Central Asia and the Caucasus to Europe. However, the meeting 
also allowed for the beginning of a dialogue on the issue that could be one of the 
most difficult in the coming months: visas. President Leonid Kuchma continually 
stressed the need to avoid a "paper curtain" as more countries implement 
European Union visa specifications. (INTERFAX, 1653 GMT, 10 Sep 99; FBIS-
SOV-1999-0910, via World News Connection) 
 
Even as it looked westward at the summit, however, the country once again 
reached out to its old partner, Russia. On the same day that Kuchma welcomed 
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summit-goers, the government announced that Russia would provide $60-$70 
million in "credits" to help fund construction of two nuclear reactors in Ukraine. 
(INTELNEWS, 0900 GMT, 9 Sep 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0910, via World News 
Connection) The "credits," which may be in the form of parts or nuclear fuel, will 
fill the vacuum created when G-7 countries did not live up to their commitment to 
help Ukraine build two reactors to replace Chernobyl.  
 
BELARUS 
Aleksandr IV? 
Did you hear the one about the dictator who feels so threatened that his 
opponents are driven from their country, kidnapped, or liquidated? How about the 
dictator who tries to use a tragedy in a neighboring country to scare his people 
into giving up their last vestiges of freedom? Or, finally, the dictator who is urged 
by the international community to become a kinder, gentler person, but who 
faces no real international sanctions or condemnation? No? Well, meet 
Alyaksandr Lukashenka, Tsar of Byelorussia. 
 
Using Soviet-style subtlety, Lukashenka has managed to deal with most of those 
opposing him. Last week, his most powerful and well-known opponent still alive 
inside Belarus mysteriously disappeared. On 16 September, Viktor Gonchar 
never returned from visiting a banya. His wife, Zinaida, told journalists that 
Gonchar called her on his cell phone as he was beginning his trip home, but 
never arrived. According to the Moscow Times, Mrs. Gonchar and a friend 
searched for her husband in the area around the banya, where they "found blood 
stains on the ground and other signs of a struggle." (MOSCOW TIMES, 23 Sep 
99; via nexis) 
 
Gonchar was deputy speaker of the disbanded 1996 parliament and the head of 
the Central Election Commission. As such, he was instrumental in organizing the 
"alternative" presidential elections held on 16 May, at the internationally 
recognized end of Lukashenka's term. Gonchar was the highest ranking member 
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of the disbanded parliament still living out of prison in Belarus. Most other 
dissidents have been arrested, have disappeared or have fled the country.  
 
The former head of the Belarusian Central Bank, Tamara Vinnikova, disappeared 
on 8 April, while former interior minister and opposition activist Yuri Zakharenko 
disappeared on 7 May. In addition, former Prime Minister Mikhail Chigir has been 
in prison since March, Popular Front leader Zyanon Paznyak has fled to live in 
the United States, Uladzimir Antonaw, head of the youth branch of the Belarusian 
People's Front, has fled to Poland and requested asylum, and Semyon 
Sharetsky, speaker of the disbanded parliament, has fled to Lithuania. (For 
information about other activists under arrest, see the NIS Observed, 4 Aug 99.)  
 
Earlier this year, there were 40 members of the disbanded parliament meeting 
regularly in opposition to Lukashenka inside Belarus. On 20 September, only 10 
former parliamentarians gathered to protest on behalf of Gonchar. (REUTERS, 
21 Sep 99; via Russia Today)  
 
Gonchar's disappearance was, unfortunately, neither shocking nor surprising. As 
reported in past issues of NIS Observed, Gonchar has been arrested several 
times in the last six months, enduring beatings in prison that reportedly caused at 
least one heart attack. He had attempted to stage a hunger strike in order to 
focus attention on the plight of Lukashenka's opponents, but the strike was 
ended by forced injections. After being brought home following those injections, 
Gonchar attempted to explain what had happened to him in prison. On 11 March, 
with the aid of his wife, he spoke through a closed door with water running 
behind him to a reporter from Russia's NTV: 
 
[Gonchar] Moreover, there were many things. They were suspending me from a 
bar in handcuffs.  
[Zinaida Gonchar, captioned as his wife, standing in front of the bathroom door] 
Suspending him.  
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[Gonchar] Zina, I will tell them everything. I just need -  
[Zinaida Gonchar] He feels bad. . . . You heard everything, didn't you? They were 
suspending him from a bar in handcuffs. Masked special police people rushed in 
and injected him with glucose by force. After that they suspended him from some 
bar on the bus. I am very grateful to you. Excuse me, I must do something now, 
maybe call an ambulance. (NTV, 1600 GMT, 11 Mar 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0311, 
via World News Connection) 
 
Little action was taken over Gonchar's plight, however, by most Western 
organizations. 
 
Unfortunately, even Gonchar's disappearance has not garnered the outrage that 
many Belarusian activists say it should. Following Gonchar's disappearance on 
16 September, it took several days for the story to slowly wend its way through 
the main Western media organizations covering Belarus (with the notable 
exception of RFE/RL). It was not until 22 September that the US Department of 
State responded to the disappearance with a press statement, noting that the US 
"is greatly concerned about this pattern of disappearances of opponents to 
Lukashenka's continued rule in Belarus." In its conclusion, the statement boldly 
said, "We call upon the Government of Belarus to do everything in its power to 
locate Mr. Gonchar...." (STATEMENT BY US DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
DEPUTY SPOKESMAN JAMES B. FOLEY, 22 Sep 99; via nexis) That should do 
it. Lukashenka is shaking now. 
 
Sharetsky responded by criticizing the international community for not acting 
more strongly against Lukashenka. He suggested that a good first step might be 
to un-invite Lukashenka to the upcoming November OSCE summit in Istanbul. 
Sharetsky said he "would be grateful" if he himself were invited "as acting 
president, in keeping with the constitution," instead of Lukashenka. (INTERFAX, 
21 Sep 99; via nexis) 
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That will indeed be an interesting test. The OSCE has so far taken no action in 
regard to Gonchar's disappearance. The organization is mediating "negotiations" 
between representatives of the opposition and Lukashenka, but, until now, has 
seen no need to adjust the timetable for the talks.  
 
Meanwhile, using the terrorist attacks in Moscow as justification, Lukashenka has 
announced tighter security in Belarus. "The so-called liberators and protectors of 
the people are prepared to use this to destabilize the situation," he said. Order 
must be brought, he explained. "We must determine where the various kinds of 
opposition and other riffraff are likely to meet," he said, and use "the toughest, 
most decisive and uncompromising measures." (NTV, 1200 GMT, 16 Sep 99; 
FBIS-SOV-1999-0916, via World News Connection) 
 
MOLDOVA 
Really? D'ya think? 
The head of the OSCE mission in Moldova has clarified the situation in 
Transdniestr for anyone who may be confused: Russia has not pulled out its 
troops and weapons. Although the country had agreed to do so, William Hill 
explained at a recent news conference, this commitment has not been met. That 
clears things up. 
 
But, have no fear, there is good news to report. Russia has submitted a schedule 
for withdrawal, and until that timetable is reached, Russian troops are helping to 
enforce previous agreements between Tiraspol and Chisinau. (INTERFAX, 17 
Sep 99; via nexis) 
 
 
This breaking news comes at a time when Moldovan President Petru Lucinschi 
has expressed concern over what he called the "diminishing" number of weapons 
in Transdniestr storage depots, and as rumors surface that Russia will begin 
tapping into the depots for use in Dagestan. It also comes as the rhetoric from 
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Tiraspol gets both more strident and more conciliatory. On 14 September, Viktor 
Sineve, first deputy prime minister of the self-proclaimed republic, portrayed the 
region as having been betrayed by Russia and Ukraine. "Tiraspol must count 
only on itself and strengthen its own statehood," he said. (INTERFAX, 14 Sep 99; 
via nexis) Around the same time, however, Dniestr parliament speaker Grigore 
Maracuta said Tiraspol was willing to reunite with Moldova, "to live in the same 
home," if, of course, Moldova meets a number of conditions. (INTERFAX, 1256 
GMT, 15 Sep 99; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, via nexis) While these 
statements may be contradictory, at least the situation with Russian troops and 
armaments is clear now. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Transcaucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
CHECHNYA 
To redress some hasty judgments 
In its reporting on Islamic terrorism and Russia's bombing of Chechnya, some 
sectors of the American press seem to have adopted a great deal of the official 
propaganda coming out of Moscow as their own analysis. 
 
Take for instance the now axiomatic statement that Russia is punishing terrorists 
for the bombings they inflicted on Moscow in recent weeks. There has not been a 
shred of evidence tying Shamil Basaev or Khattab -- even less so Maskhadov -- 
to the explosions that killed over 300 people. In fact, there are some very sound 
reasons to doubt the truth of the repeated accusations.  
 
First, the attacks in Moscow have nothing in common with Basaev and Khattab's 
usual method of operations. Basaev first gained notoriety after carrying out an 
audacious raid: He took a hospital captive in the Russian city of Budennovsk. 
The action was calculated to attract mass attention and force the Chernomyrdin 
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government to call a cease-fire and return to the negotiating table. Basaev's 
detachment, while inflicting great cruelty on captured Russian servicemen, 
avoided taking civilian lives. The vast majority of those killed in that 1995 
hostage-taking incident were shot by the Russian troops who tried to storm the 
hospital -- not by the Chechens. Similarly, Khattab has frequently launched 
small-scale attacks on Russian military bases and MVD posts in Dagestan -- but 
while he has bombed military installations, and even barracks, he has never 
been known to target civilians. Second, Basaev and Khattab derive their prestige 
and notoriety from such incursions -- their reputation for military skill and audacity 
requires that they take responsibility for the raids they inflict on the opponent. Yet 
they have denied responsibility for the bombings. 
 
Finally, what do the field commanders gain from terrorizing the Russian 
population? As Garry Kasparov commented in The Wall Street Journal on 30 
September, the opposition of the Russian public brought the Chechen war to an 
end in 1996. The revulsion of the liberal portions of the population and the 
indifference of the majority deprived the war effort of the moral stamina 
necessary to carry on a protracted campaign. The bombings in Moscow which 
were attributed to the Chechens so quickly and with no evidence at all have 
fundamentally altered the public attitude. At this point even liberal politicians like 
Yavlinsky speak out against the Chechen menace. Now thousands of people of 
"Caucasian nationality" are forced to flee Moscow -- where they are subject to 
beatings from police and other forms of official harassment. For the first time, the 
public opinion polls favor bombing Chechnya. Surely the field commanders have 
gained nothing from the bombings. 
 
Speculation in the Russian media include that the FSB set the bombs at the 
Kremlin's behest to create a chaotic situation and use it to postpone the 
elections. Another version suggests that "The Family" may have planned the 
attacks to force Yel'tsin's hand against his opposition. Although also based on 
conjecture, these explanations at least focus on the question who benefited from 
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the explosions -- clearly the Security Services and the present administration. As 
the very astute Mr. Kasparov comments, the government does not need to call a 
state of emergency or impose martial law: "The constitutional rights of Russian 
citizens have never posed a serious obstacle to excessive police activities." The 
frightened public is only too willing to tolerate random searches and the 
imposition of new rules for residency registration in the capital. This situation 
benefits any future government since it can tighten the screws on its own 
population while turning a democratic Islamic-terrorist-fighting face to the West. 
 
Nothing like Kosovo 
The idea that the current Russian campaign against Dagestan and Chechnya 
was somehow modeled on or influenced by NATO's Kosovo operation is another 
one of those official Kremlin pretexts that the Western media have taken to 
chanting at every opportunity. For instance, Michael Gordon employs the phrase 
"As with NATO" as a refrain throughout his extremely superficial New York Times 
article which appeared on 28 September. Yes, in some very basic ways the 
bombing of Serbia and of Chechnya are alike -- in both cases bombs were used 
to take out important elements of the infrastructure, in both cases commanders 
briefed the press about their activities. The similarities end there.  
 
Rightly or wrongly, NATO went into Kosovo to address an unfolding humanitarian 
crisis characterized by massive refugee displacement in Kosovo. The Russian 
military and MVD are causing the humanitarian crisis by bombing villages and 
cities. Ruslan Aushev, the president of neighboring Ingushetia which has already 
accommodated over 50,000 refugees, says that his republic cannot take in more 
persons because his government will soon run out of food. (RIA NEWS 
AGENCY, 1446 GMT, 27 Sep 99; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, via nexis) 
Human rights activists in Moscow complain bitterly about the plight of the dark-
skinned people deported forcibly from the capital. By 28 September, nearly 600 
hundred persons had been deported from Moscow, while another 20,000 were 
not permitted to register. (KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA, 28 Sep 99; RUSSICA, 
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via nexis) What is happening in Chechnya? As a consequence of the bombings 
of communication channels like television stations and cellular phone facilities, 
no one knows the exact situation. Yet given the history of the previous conflict, 
many worry about the magnitude of civilian suffering. The war can only be won 
by "carrying out genocide," noted human rights campaigner Sergei Kovalev 
warned the press. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 29 Sep 99) 
 
Through its bombing campaign NATO sought to remove Milosevic's forces from 
Kosovo and has since made the public admission that it would prefer if he was 
removed from power. Russia has repeatedly recognized Maskhadov as the 
legitimate leader of Chechnya. He represents moderate and reasonable positions 
within the Chechen political spectrum. He is well respected in Moscow and ever 
since his election has been seen as a worthy negotiating partner. Surely Moscow 
is not trying to replace Maskhadov? The idea that Moscow can destroy terrorist 
cells by bombing Dzhokhar-gala is too ludicrous to bother refuting.  
 
The real precedent to the current conflict is the 1994-96 war. Of course Western 
commentators have little to say about that comparison because they barely 
noticed the war the first time around. Yet important elements of the war's 
inception are virtually identical: Russian military and security services provoked 
the Chechen leaders through small-scale covert engagements. (This has been 
happening all summer: See earlier issues of the NIS Observed.) Unable to rout 
the Chechen forces quickly, they had to undertake a massive ground campaign 
that led to over 100,000 civilian deaths over a period of two years. The war 
destroyed the Chechen economy and infrastructure, mangled the fates of 
countless persons on both sides, created a devastated and desperate nation 
living on the margins of legality and brought no political resolution to the conflict.  
 
In sum, NATO does not need to teach Russia how to carpet bomb a city -- that is 
a practice the Russians perfected in assaults on Dzhokhar in December of 1994. 
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A shadow over the entire Caucasus 
Should Russian leaders sense that they have the endorsement of Western 
leaders, as was the case in the 1994-96 war, they may well try to use the 
"terrorist" argument to further cower other states in the region. Some have 
already reported rumors that Basaev might spend the winter in Georgia, which 
has prompted the Russian side to increase its presence in the military base in 
Abkhazia. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 29 Sep 99) It is not too difficult to 
imagine the Russians using the conflict in the north to apply greater pressure to 
Georgia, a country already under extensive Russian occupation. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
Former Kazakh premier arrested, then released by Russian police 
Aqezhan Qazhegeldyn, Kazakhstan's former prime minister and leader of the 
People's Republican Party (a prominent opposition party), was arrested by 
Russian law enforcement officials in Moscow earlier this month. Mr. 
Qazhegeldyn, rather surprisingly, was en route to his home country, where he 
planned to visit two cities in western Kazakhstan. The former premier's decision 
to travel to Kazakhstan was apparently made in response to a Washington Times 
article written by Bolat Nurghaliev, the Kazakh ambassador to the US, in which 
the ambassador claimed that the Kazakh government would take no legal action 
against Mr. Qazhegeldyn should he decide to return for a visit. (RFE/RL 
NEWSLINE, 13 Sep 99) However, Kazakhstan's prosecutor general, Yuri Khitrin, 
had already issued a warrant for Mr. Qazhegeldyn's arrest through Interpol, on 
the grounds that the former premier is withholding documents relating to the 
corruption charges brought against him by the Kazakh justice ministry and has 
ignored 10 summons to return to Kazakhstan for questioning in connection with 
those charges. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 16 Sep 99) Instead of 
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transporting him to jail, however, Russian MVD officials were obliged to take Mr. 
Qazhegeldyn to a hospital, due to the fact that shortly after his arrest he suffered 
a possible heart attack. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 13 Sep 99) 
 
Following the news of Mr. Qazhegeldyn's arrest, members of his party, the 
Communist Party and other opposition groups began staging demonstrations in 
Almaty and Astana to protest his detention. US Department of State officials, as 
well as a number of Congressmen, reportedly also interceded on the former 
prime minister's behalf, requesting that he be released. (Jamestown Foundation 
MONITOR, 16 Sep 99) Mr. Qazhegeldyn went so far as to appeal to President 
Yel'tsin himself, stating that if he were extradited to Kazakhstan, his life would be 
in danger. (INTERFAX, 1640 GMT, 12 Sep 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0912, via World 
News Connection) 
 
On 15 September, the Kazakh prosecutor general canceled the warrant for Mr. 
Qazhegeldyn's arrest, ostensibly on "humanitarian grounds" due to the ex-
premier's poor health, whereupon he was released by Russian authorities. 
(RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 16 Sep 99) Although Mr. Qazhegeldyn's own stature and 
personal connections to Russian President Boris Yel'tsin undoubtedly played a 
role in securing his freedom, there can be no question that the intercession of 
several highly placed US officials on his behalf was also extremely influential. 
The furor that the former prime minister's arrest provoked on the part of the US 
government provides a stark contrast to the indifference which the State 
Department has displayed over the hundreds of arrests and human rights 
violations against other opposition activists in Central Asia. The widespread 
political repressions carried out by both the Uzbek and Turkmen governments 
have evoked little or no comment from influential figures in the US political arena. 
 
It remains to be seen whether Mr. Qazhegeldyn's allies in the US Congress and 
administration will continue to speak out on his behalf as he is forced to contend 
with the newest accusations which the Kazakh government has put forward 
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against him The day of his release, Kazakhstan's National Security Committee 
issued a statement implicating him in the illegal sale of 40 MiG-21 fighter aircraft 
to North Korea. According to this statement, the scheme to sell the fighters was 
formulated as early as December 1996, while Mr. Qazhegeldyn still held the post 
of prime minister. The fact that the sales transaction was not concluded until well 
after Mr. Qazhegeldyn had resigned from his post does not seem to absolve him 
of any guilt in the eyes of the Kazakh authorities at this point. (INTERFAX, 0938 
GMT, 15 Sep 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0915, via World News Connection)  
 
KYRGYZSTAN 
Kyrgyz government still struggling to subdue insurgents 
On 27 September, Kyrgyz Prime Minister Amangeldy Muraliev announced that 
his country's troops had cut off all access to the insurgents' bases in southern 
Kyrgyzstan and that the situation was beginning to stabilize. (RFE/RL 
NEWSLINE, 27 Sep 99) Less than 24 hours later, a number of rebels launched 
another attack on Kyrgyz government troops. Although the rebel group retreated 
when government forces retaliated (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 29 Sep 99), the 
militants' actions are a clear indication that despite the prime minister's optimism, 
Kyrgyzstan's military forces have not yet been able to isolate the insurgent 
groups which have occupied Batken District for more than a month now. In fact, 
according to most reports, the rebel groups seem to be able to move between 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan at will and do not appear to be in danger of running out 
of supplies. Thus far, Kyrgyz troops have only managed to thwart the rebels' 
attempts to break into the Uzbek enclave of Sokh (near the Uzbek-Kyrgyz 
border). (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 20 Sep 99) 
 
The whereabouts of the 13 hostages still held by the insurgents remain unknown; 
it is thought that they are frequently moved from one location to another, 
including back and forth across the Tajik-Kyrgyz border. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 
21 Sep 99) From time to time, the rebels seize additional hostages on a short-
term basis, allegedly in order to use them as human shields.  
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The rebels' goals remain as unclear as ever; their leaders have made no 
additional demands of either the Uzbek or Kyrgyz governments. One of the 
insurgents' original two conditions for releasing the 13 hostages has been at least 
partially met: Uzbek President Karimov released approximately 300 political 
prisoners on 22 September, most of whom had been sentenced to jail terms due 
to their alleged membership in illegal Muslim groups. (Jamestown Foundation 
MONITOR, 24 Sep 99) However, so far none of the rebel leaders in Kyrgyzstan 
has responded to President Karimov's recent conciliatory action. 
 
The militants' only visible goal at this point seems to be to return to Uzbekistan, a 
demand which the Uzbek government adamantly refuses even to discuss. So 
long as both the Kyrgyz and Uzbek governments refuse to engage in official 
negotiations with the rebels, it is difficult to predict a peaceful end to the conflict. 
For the moment, the situation seems to have reached a stalemate. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
ESTONIA 
Budget cuts lead to inevitable layoffs 
Between resignations and planned layoffs in the government and military sectors, 
there is decreasing job security in the northernmost Baltic state. An IMF report in 
May warned that spending for the government sector had increased too quickly, 
and recommended that the 1999 budget be decreased mid-year by at least 2 
million kroons (roughly US$135 million). (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY 
REPORT, 1300 GMT, 6 May 99) While such a substantial cut proved politically 
unfeasible, trimming for the new year has begun. As Estonia struggles to get a 
grip on its growing deficit, one area that will suffer is employment. Interior 
Minister Juri Mois announced his plans to halve the workforce at his ministry. A 
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thorough restructuring is foreseen, with the abolition of three deputy general 
secretarial positions and dismissals of senior officials. The interior ministry has 
been allocated 70 million kroons less in the year 2000 budget than this year's 
allotment, which has accelerated the restructuring plan. Procrastination with 
administrative reform could lead to mass dismissals, Mois said. Further 
restructuring, to focus on the ministry's subordinate institutions, also is planned. 
(BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1000 GMT, 2 Sep 99) 
 
Mois later explained that layoffs also are planned for the Police Department, 
where 534 policemen will face unemployment. The cutbacks are designed, 
according to the Police Department, to make the work done there more efficient, 
thereby answering criticism from a European Union working group which 
reported that police efficiency is below the international average, judging by the 
percentage of crimes solved. Another problem, according to the working group, is 
that the department is top heavy; however, the layoffs announcement did not 
specify which tier would be most affected. Rescue Department, Border Guards, 
and the Citizenship and Immigration Department also are facing cuts. (RADIO 
TALLINN NETWORK, 1400 GMT, 17 Sep 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0918, via World 
News Connection)  
 
Some job loss wasn't due to budget cuts: Two high-level officials submitted 
resignations in September. Major General Ants Laaneots, chief of staff of the 
defense forces, submitted his formal resignation on 1 September, the final 
movement in an inelegant shuffle begun in July when President Lennart Meri 
unexpectedly appointed Colonel Urman Roosimagi as acting commander of the 
defense forces. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1000 GMT, 15 Jul 
99) Speculation abounded that Laaneots was resigning due to his being 
bypassed for the top post by an officer junior to him. Understandable though that 
would be, the slight probably was more pragmatic than personal. Roosimagi's 
promotion could be the result of Estonia's application to NATO, and a belief that 
the advancement of Western-trained officers such as Roosimagi (trained in 
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Finland) might help to create a more favorable impression to Western-based 
military alliances than forces led by Laaneots, a former Soviet Army officer. While 
Laaneots has not commented on the situation, an indication of the atmosphere 
between Laaneots and Roosimagi was provided by the latter's statement when 
news of the resignation was released. "Well, life will go on," Roosimagi said. 
(BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1000 GMT, 1 Sep 99) Laaneots will 
move to a position at the Baltic Defense College.  
 
In addition, the director general of the State Chancellery, Meelis Pihel, submitted 
his resignation in mid-September, leaving a position he had filled since March. 
(RADIO TALLINN NETWORK, 1200 GMT, 15 Sep 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0916) No 
additional details were available. 
 
LITHUANIA 
Deadline for oil project agreement slips by 
Clearly working on the belief that the squeaky wheel gets the grease (or, in this 
case, the oil profits), Russia's LUKoil continues to threaten to withhold shipments 
of crude supplies to Lithuania's Mazaikiai oil refinery if not given the opportunity 
for equal partnership in the enterprise. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY 
REPORT, 1300 GMT, 3 Sep 99) Disruptions of the oil supply from Russia have 
cost the refinery in the past; shutdowns in February and May for a total of 26 
days brought about a loss of one million litas (US$250,000) per day. 
 
While it is extremely unlikely that LUKoil's demands will be met, and much more 
likely that the demand is standard operating procedure for negotiations, accord 
between the Lithuanian government and the US-based Williams International has 
yet to be reached. The parties have repeatedly postponed signing the 
agreements since late 1998. There has been no official statement on the reason 
for the latest delay, however, one can assume that Williams' hesitancy is due to 
its not having all of its legislative ducks in a row as yet. Earlier negotiations had 
resulted in agreement to change the shareholder structure of the oil complex, 
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allowing a foreign concern to hold a majority stake and providing shareholder 
opportunities to banks involved in the financing of the project. (BALTIC NEWS 
SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1300 GMT, 24 Aug 99) The government also has 
voted to grant special railway and oil product export tariffs, and oil tankers can be 
serviced by Williams-employed pilots (as opposed to Lithuanian pilots). The 
government and Williams had agreed on the initial sale of 33 percent of Mazeikia 
Oil to the US company, and Williams -- which earlier hoped to be able to double 
its stake at a later date -- has agreed to a maximum of 51 percent of shares. 
(BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1300 GMT, 2 Sep 99) While that 
action would immediately negate LUKoil's demand for an equal partnership, the 
Russian oil supplier is not being ignored. According to the agreements being 
worked out with Williams, Lithuania is also to sell up to a 19-percent stake in the 
refinery to a crude oil supplier, and is believed to be negotiating with LUKoil for 
that portion. (FINANCIAL TIMES, 2 Sep 99; via nexis) 
 
Many of these agreements will require legislative approval, however. The Seimas 
began debates on amending six laws to validate the government's concessions, 
and objections thus far have been voiced by the Social Democrats. Center 
Union, New Union and the Democratic Labor Party. The majority of the ruling 
Conservatives are in favor of the bills, though, so the legislation most likely will 
pass. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1600 GMT, 14 Sep 99) 
 
The attraction of the oil project is not lost on others, either. Clearly, ongoing 
energy demands and Lithuania's pragmatic approach to shore up its oil industry 
have proven attractive to potential investors. The European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) recently stated its interest in 
participating as a shareholder and as an investor during a meeting with Economy 
Minister Eugenijus Maldeikis in Vilnius. The meeting was also attended by 
representatives of Williams International, Chase Manhattan and Paribas banks, 
the International Finance Corporation, and the legal firm Glinsted from Sweden. 
(BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1000 GMT, 19 Aug 99) 
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